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Abstracts.
The aim of this paper is to give an overwiev of the behavior of manufacturing firms, in
particular the small ones and to go deeper into the conclusion of a previous paper ( « Equity and rate
of return », ewp-fin-9608001 and International Council of Small Business, Sydney, June 1996). After
some quotes about capital structure and private firms, a comparison of own funds is made between
german, french, spanish, italian and austrian manufacturing firms. We can find that french
manufacturing firms, for each size studied, are less indebted than their foreign counterparts.
Otherwise, french small firms are more profitable and more efficient than the larger ones. We then
point out two economic behaviors. The first one depends on growth capacity of the firms and also on
their accumulation outlay; the second depends on the intensity of the links with the financial markets,
the facilities to obtain lendable funds, all aspects which oblige firms to make high financial
profitabilities that can reduce accumulation decisions.
The purpose of this paper is to look further into the conclusions forwarded in preceding seeks
concerning the comparison of the performances and the capitalizations of SME and the large companies
( « Equity and rate of return » ewp-fin/9608001). After have to point out the role of the own funds at
the same time from a theoretical point of view but also within the framework of a conservative
appreciation of the solvency of the firms, a reconciliation of the charges in own funds of the firms of
manufacturing industry in Europe is commented on. Then while concentrating on the French firms of
1985 to 1995 we identify specific behaviors. The assumption of economic logic different is then
advanced. This one takes support on the limits of the size as explanatory factor of the risk ( Cieply,
                                               
1 Banque de France is not engaged by the analysis and comments made.2
Paranque, 1996) and the nature of the constraints to be managed according to the procedures to acceed
to the financial markets ( Harris, Raviv, 1989 ).
1) THE DIVERSITY OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATIONS
To wonder about the financing of SME requires to recognize the diversity of the industrial
situations which is induced by the very large variety of the modes of management. Those correspond to
the arbitrations effected at various stages of the operation of the firm in order to make it powerful.
1 Choices of management
To evaluate the performances of the firm, it is important to take into account the various types
of choices which condition perenniality of it. These choices are of three types:
- choices of market, namely the identification of a need to be satisfied under profitable
conditions, according to the mode and conditions of financing obtained (Paranque, Rivaud-Danset,
Salais 1996);
- choices of investment, in other words the definition of a productive combination integrating at
the same time technology and organization;
- choices of an organisation, which determine the conditions of control of the times of return on
investment and, more largely, those of the implementation of the productive combination.
It is in the light of these choices, and in particular among those which relate to the policy of
investment, that one can analyze the problems of financing, and in particular gaps of charges in own
funds between the firms of different size. And, it is while wondering about the foundations of the
profitability of the firm which one can determine if the problems of financing and to accede to the credit
which SME know are due or not to the fact that their performances are insufficient compared to those of
firms of bigger size.
This step is more essential than it clarifies the specificity of the financing of SME, generally
underestimated when it is a question of their difficulties. If these difficulties can go hand in hand with3
the insufficiency of own funds, the relation is far from being bi-univocal. Many factors, independent of
the insufficiency of own funds as such, are likely to contribute to the bad health of a firm. It can result,
for example, of an investments badly targeted or whose times of return are too long (or longer than
foreseen), which involves a heaviness of the leverage (to finance the delay) and an incapacity to ensure
the charge of the debt (by insufficiency of wealth created). Loss of one or several markets can also
cause serious difficulties, in the same way than a too strong dependence with respect to customers or
suppliers.
2 Sources of financing
To be financed, a firm has two main categories of resources.
The first, of external origin, is consisted of the contributions of the shareholders and the
borrowings near the credit institutions. The contribution of the shareholders forms the authorized
capital. This last, with the reserves generated by the benefit of the former years which were not
distributed and the result of the exercise, constitutes the stockholders' equity. The own funds represent a
notion broader than that of the authorized capital: they integrate contributions of shareholders, who are
different from the precedents by the rights which are conferred on their bond, but also other stable
resources without voting rights. In the text which follows, the term of own funds is employed, unless
otherwise specified, in the generic direction of contribution of stable resources. The borrowings
contracted near the credit institutions correspond to the financial debts which give place to the payment
of an interest (financial expenses) and to repayment. Interest charges and repayment correspond to the
charge of the debt which one reports to the surplus gross overall. This one is established by deducing
from the added value the personnel costs and the taxes and taxes.
The second category of resources is of internal origin. These resources are obtained by the own
activity of the firm and result from its sales, because of its marketing policy and of its policy of
investment. They enable the firm to refund its borrowings, to renew, even to increase its outputs, to pay
dividends with its shareholders and to assign whole or part of its results to the stockholders' equity. In
this last case, it capitalizes its results. The capacity of self-financing is the usual indicator of this
internal resource, although the added value can claim also there.4
The distinction made according to the origin and the nature of the resources at the disposal of
the firms covers with the economic differences as for the consequences and the chattels of their
mobilization. Indeed, in asymmetry of information one can think that a firm treats on a hierarchical
basis its preferences between various sources of financing (Myers, 1977, 1984; Majluf and Meyers,
1984).
3 The role of the own funds
The own funds have as a cardinal function to guarantee the solvency of firms, its capacity to
face its financial commitments. They constitute, for a firm and for the economic agents which are
involved there, a « holds » of safety making it possible to deal with the internal or external accidents.
The own funds are characterized by triple quality (Manceau, 1992):
_ they have null current liability ; in other words, a shareholder cannot require from the firm the
repayment of his shares, as it is the case for a loan whose date of repayment is fixed by contract;
_ this capital cannot claim with a fixed remuneration, the distribution depends on a general
decision of the meeting of the shareholders;
_ they have as an ultimate function to cover the risk, namely to refund the debts contracted by
the firm in the event of failure of this one.
If it is thus essential for a firm to hold a minimum of own funds, it is, on the other hand,
difficult to define an optimal division between own funds and debt ( Harris and Raviv, 1989 ). In fact,
each firm will seek to optimize the recourse to the external financing, by taking account of the cost of
this one but also according to the autonomy degree the firm wants ( or can ) to safeguard and of the
projects of development which she wants to implement. Multiplicity of the possible arbitrations between
the various sources of financing (intern and external) induced of the behaviors which vary from a firm
to another, from category of society to another.5
2) COMPARISON ENTERS SME AND THE LARGES COMPANIES
A comparison between European industrial firms over the period 1991-1993 stresses the good
financial health of French society, in particular of SME ( Comité Européen des Centrales de Bilans,
1997).
If the ratio is considered net equity / financial resources in median:
- the German firms seem most slightly equipped, at 10 points behind Italian;
- French and Spanish society are capitalized, whereas the Austrian firms are in an intermediate
situation.
This report is valid over all the studied period. From 1991 to 1993, the ratio declined for the
German firms whereas Italian and Spanish society strengthens their position lightly.
1 French firms vis-a-vis their homologues European
The analyse of teh effect of size on the capitalization of the firms in 1993 provides two principal
lesson:6
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- the influence from the size of the firms on their level of capitalization strongly varies from a
country to another. It is very important in Austria and even more in Germany : the difference between
the firms which realize less than 5 million ecus of sales and those whose sales exceed more than 100
million is 36.7 in Austria and 50.8 in Germany against 18.1 in France. On the other hand, the influence
of the size is quasi non-existent in Italy and Spain, contrary to the three other countries where the
financial autonomy more or less strongly grows with the size.
- the gaps are much more important between the small firms than between the very large ones.
In German SME (of less than 5 million ecus of net turnover), the own funds in median represent only
20.3% of financial resources whereas this percentage reaches 30.7% in Austria, 47.9% in Italy, 60.4%
in France and 65.1% in Spain, for the same category of firms. On the other hand, for the very large
companies ( up to 100 million ecus of net turnover ) the gaps are rather weak if one excludes Italy.
Thus, in this category of population, the median of the report net " equity/financial resources " is of
67.4% in Austria, of 67.3% in Spain, 71.1% in Germany and of 78.5% in France, that is to say a7
maximum change of 16 points (or of 30.7 points if one includes Italy). It thus would seem that the
recourse to the international financial markets by the large companies leads to a certain harmonization
of their structures of financing.
2 Comparative Results of small and large French companies of 1985 to 1995
Between 1985 and 1995, SME strengthened their own funds (own funds/ capital financing
involved) of almost 10 points. It is true that the restoration of financial autonomy was more sustained in
society of more than 500 labours (+ 15.4 points), but the level reached by SME at the beginning of the
1990's corresponds to that of the large companies at the end of the Eighties. In fact, this reconciliation
between SME and large companies have little direction if one does not study the needs for financings
which correspond to each case and reflect different logics of operation. In other words, it is important to
analyse the relationship with the overall behavior of this one.the to appreciate correctly the financial
autonomy and conditions of its financing. If they are well interpreted, the examination of several
indicators of performance, in the form of ratios, makes it possible to evaluate the results of the firm. On
the other hand, the recourse to only one ratio is insufficient to include/understand the real operation of
firms as well as the way in which it manages its outlets and the requirements of remuneration of the
contributors of capital, shareholders and lenders.
If one judges some by their accumulation rate, therefore by balancing the rate of investsement
(investment / added value) by the efficiency of the capital (added value / capital), it appears that SME
invest more than the large companies. However which says more important investment said more
substantial needs for financing (including for working capital), which results in a recourse to the higher
external financing. These requirements in financing also depend on the relations maintained with the
economic partners and on nature of insertion of entreprise in the trace (domination or dependence
between agents, type of subcontracting carried out).
In terms of economic profitability (gross operating profit margin / capital involved), the
performance of SME is higher than those of the firms of more than 500 people, except in 1992 and
1993 when it is similar. It is also the case in terms of gross financial profitability, " gross cash flow (8
gross operating margin after payment of taxes and of the financial expenses ) / own funds ": over all the
studied period, the financial profitability of SME is higher than that of the large companies.
On the other hand, after deduction of depreciation or the dividends paid with the shareholders.
- thus, in terms of financial profitability after distribution ( gross cash flow less dividends paid /
own funds ), SME are increasingly more profitable than the large companies, the weight of the
dividends is indeed higher in the large companies than in SME. This ratio constitutes an indicator of
profitability after remuneration of the shareholders, therefore an instrument of evaluation of the capacity
of capitalization of firms, before taking into account of the investment policy;
- conversely, in terms of net financial profitability ( net cash flow before dividends paid / equity
), the performance is a little higher for the large companies than for SME.
No differences appear when we deduct both dividends paid and capital consumption allowances.
Thus, by analyzing the various stages of the process of activity of the firm, one notes that the
capacity of capitalization of the results, and thus of reinforcement of the stockholders' equity, defers
little from a category of size of firm to another. On the other hand, the weight of the charges to
depreciation is higher in SME, whereas that of the dividends is less there than in the large companies.
The effective reinforcement thus depends on the decisions which each matter firm makes into affectation
of their results, i.e. according to whether it chooses to assign its benefit to the investment, degearing or
capitalization.9
SME and large companies of the manufacturing industry of 1985 to 1995
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Own funds / financial
resources
SFs 62,0 63,2 63,8 64,0 63,9 64,4 65,7 67,0 69,7 71,0 71,8
LFs 64,2 67,0 70,3 71,6 71,1 71,5 73,5 74,8 77,6 79,0 79,6
Accumulation rate *
SFs 13,5** 14,3 15,4 16,3 16,8 17,1 14,6 12,7 10,3** 10,9 11,8
LFs 13,2 13,2 13,0 13,8 14,8 14,8 13,1 11,6 9,4 8,2 9,5
Added value/ employed
capital*
SFs 79,1 78,1 76,0 75,3 74,3 73,6 70,9 68,1 65,0 65,8 66,1
LFs 59,9 60,1 59,0 58,3 56,7 54,2 52,4 50,7 46,8 47,7 46,7
Gross profit
margin/added value *
SFs 23,1** 24,1** 24,0 25,0 25,9 25,9 24,6 23,2 21,5 22,8 22,7
LFs 22,1 23,4 25,8 27,3 28,2 29,1 27,9 26,2 24,2 26,6 26,3
Economic profitability (
ROA )*
SFs 14,9 15,7 15,9 16,5 16,9 16,7 15,3 13,5** 12,2** 13,0 13,1
LFs 13,0 13,8 14,4 15,2 15,2 14,7 13,7 12,8 13,4 11,8 11,5
Gross  financial
profitability*
SFs 12,1 13,7 14,1 15,6 16,5 16,4 14,6 12,8 11,1 12,5 12,4
LFs 10,2 11,1 12,2 13,2 14,0 13,2 12,2 11,5 9,5 10,5 10,1
Gross cash flow after
distribution/
own funds *
SFs 10,5 12,2 12,3 13,6 14,4 14,1 12,2 10,4 8,4 9,7 9,4
LFs 8,5 9,3 10,1 10,7 11,2 10,2 9,1 8,8 6,0 7,0 6,8
Net cash flow/equity**
SFs -2,1 1,6 2,7 3,7 5,6 3,8 0,6 -3,1* -6,2 -1,4 0,5
LFs -3,8 0,5 4,2 7,4 7,4 7,0 2,3 2,4 -2,3 1,7 2,4
Dividends/equity *
SFs 1,7 1,8 2,3 2,7 3,1 3,4 3,4 3,3 3,9 4,0 4,4
LFs 2,8 2,6 3,7 4,6 5,3 5,6 5,4 5,2 6,0 6,1 6,5
Capital consumption
allowances / own funds *
SFs 10,0 10,0 10,1 10,7 11,1 11,6 11,4 11,2 10,2 9,5 9,3
LFs 8,7 8,6 8,0 8,2 7,9 8,4 8,3 7,9 7,5 6,8 6,7
Source et  réalisation : Banque de France
* statistically discernible gap with the threshold of 5
** nonsignificant gap.
This opposition between SME and large companies is certainly simplistic for all SME are not
intended to become large companies. On the other hand, very undertaken is confronted with problems of





The gaps as regards distribution of dividends illustrate different economic logics, one more
industrial, the other more financial. The large firms know a constraint of profitability specific to the
shareholders, because of intensity of their bonds with the financial market: the net financial profitability
and the remuneration of the shareholders must be higher there than in the small firms. In SME, the
constraint of profitability is more important to the lenders than in the large companies: it is necessary
that economic profitability is stronger there to ensure the charge of the debt and the weight of the
investment policy.
The financial standing of SME is more sensitive to the charge of the debt than their development
strongly depends on the evolution of the outlets, without their assets having a value other than
accounting because of the lack of financial market which is adapted to them. They are obliged to invest
to continue to develop. This need can be contradictory with the distribution of dividends or induce a
profitability lower than that which one considers " normal ", and this for one length of time higher than
the horizons of the financial markets. In addition, the requirements for profitability which characterize
the financial markets do not coincide inevitably with the choices of development of SME, which are
dictated by a real activity. A new shareholders has no reason to agree to this logic: either he is not
interested to invest, or it will introduce a more or less large distortion between the logic of SME and its
own needs for remuneration. SME react to this distortion by an important flexibility generates: of the
high efforts of renewal of equipment and workers with considerable know-how enables them to adapt
quickly to the developments. By doing this, if they can't get new shareholders, they can nevertheless
control the constraint of solvency, in so far as their outlets are maintained, failing to grow.11
Because of that and their place in the productive system, SME are by no means defined as "
small large companies ". They are controls by a different logic than the large companies ones. One
could describe it as logic of accumulation under constraint of outlets, the constraint of profitability "
playing only " like forces reminder in the market rates. This logic of accumulation corresponds to the
need for increasing or for developing the productive potential to answer the request. It acts as much a
development in volume (rise of the capacities) than in quality (new technology, modernization,
innovation) to meet the needs expressed by the customers and the clients.
The large companies, as for them, would obey a logic of capitalization under constraint of
profitability, in particular financial, the constraint of outlets being processed through alliances,
reorganizations of the assets, dominant position. The constraint on these firms is trained through
arbitrations to which the financial markets between various investment appropriatenesses are delivered.
The logic of capitalization then consists in making sure that the difference between the expectations of
growth of the firm and the evaluations to which the speakers proceed on the markets coincide as well as
possible, not to call into question the structures and financial balances of society. In this case, the pivot
of the performance is not any more the rate of accumulation, but well profitability.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the handicap of SME as regards financing would be of two types :
- on the one hand, the risk concerning SME less touches with their profitability than the
uncertainty on their perenniality, which directly poses the problem of their capacity required to their
financial partners information on the way in which they manage this perenniality ;
- in the other hand, the development and the liberalization of the financial markets increased the
volatility of the operation of the markets. The credit banks and, more largely, institutions are confronted
with temporality gap between the rate/rhythm of these markets and that of real activity of the firms.
They react to the cost of this shift either by reducing their margin, or by increasing the selectivity of
their offers of loanings. This selectivity runs on the quantities offered or the interest rate. SME are then
particularly handicapped compared to the other firms. The large companies, forwarded to the same12
financial strategy, answer it by adapting their investment and employment policy while resorting to the
financial markets. On the other hand, SME are more passive and are forwarded to the " regulation " by
the financial markets. It thus appears that problems of SME are more one problems of financing of the
growth that of reinforcement of the own funds.
The differences in logics of behavior, as well in the formation of profitability as in the
procedures of financing, then result in defining SME as a firm whose bonds are not negotiated on a
market.
If the balance sheet evaluation of the financial standing of SME can incite to believe that their
level of capitalization is insufficient, on the other hand, the analysis of their economic and financial
behaviour indicates an accumulation rate and an economic and financial profitabilities higher than those
of the large companies and a financial autonomy higher than those their homologues European. The
potential profit discounted from a participation to the  capital of SME is thus as high as that which can
be obtained in a firm of more important size. However, the realization of this profit and the amonut of
capitalization will depend on the intensity of the accumulationt and then the amount of capital
consumption allowances, which will determine the distribution of dividends.
In fact, it seems that SME are confronted at the two specific risks : the insolvability one in the
badly controlled case of investments and / or of fall of activity ; and the loss of competitiveness if, to
face the first risk, they reduce their accumulation intensity. Taking into account the levels of
performances noted in 1995, the second risk appears most urgent today to reduce.
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